Voice of Iraq Exclusive
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CONVERSATIONS WITH SHEIK ALI AL-MUTHABA
This is the third in a three-part series of articles, written for Voice of Iraq by Andreas Bartels, a German journalist and novelist, detailing the work of the JAM Political-Military Affairs and Special Operations Command and its Senior Commander, Sheik Ali Al-Muthaba, aka Mr. Albrecht Gero Muth. The series is based on a number of interviews, conducted over the course of several days in September and October 2007. The first part (3rd October 2007) addresses itself on a proposed Summit of Militia Leaders, to be convened in furtherance of the process for national reconciliation, in advance of a national accord. The second part (10th October 2007) addresses itself on the ongoing transformation of JAM into an “Army for Peace,” the evolution of the Sadrist Movement into a Civil Rights Movement and Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq, and the Sadrist vision for the New and Democratic Iraq. The third part (17th October 2007) addresses itself on the Bagdad Security Plan, the Iraq War, the War on Terrorism and the Sadrist gameplan for the Road to National Awakening.
ON THE ROAD TO IRAQ’S NATIONAL AWAKENING
By Andreas Bartels
Sadr City, BAGDAD, Al-Iraq, 17th October 2007. In September 2007, General David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, reports to the United States Congress on progress of the Bagdad Security Plan. In announcing a surge of U.S. forces in January 2007, in support of the plan, Mr. George W. Bush, the American President, defined the goal: “The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. …When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas.”
Spending time in Iraq, between spring and fall, I see no marked, let alone sustainable, improvements in “daily life.” Shops closed. Banks closed. Schools closed. Restaurant patrons on the edge. Electricity non-existent. Food and water shortages abound. With half the Cabinet posts vacant, the Government unable to function. None of the draft bills, critical to national reconciliation, having been agreed upon, Parliament recesses for a month. No draft bills to discuss, no agenda, no purpose in staying, Parliamentarians justify their break. Break from what, I wonder. Some improvements in security, here, less, there. Still, going out to fetch a pizza, a very questionable proposition. A movie? Hardly. Cross town? Never. And Iraqis are expected to have “confidence” in their leaders? I should think, not.
And, yet, with the surge already having lasted longer and more troops having been inserted than initially led on, the highly decorated American General Officer assures incredulous American lawmakers that U.S. and Iraqi military and security forces are making measurable progress, in some areas, in improving the security situation, while not in others, and that while the Iraqi Government’s failure to take advantage from improved security in furtherance of the political objectives, set forth in Congressionally-mandated benchmarks, set to measure success, is disappointing, the situation on the ground is, at once, sufficiently well advanced to permit the commencement of a phased “redeployment without replacement” of U.S. forces, to commence in December 2007 and to run through summer 2008, as it is too early to make a final determination as to what course of post-surge action to pursue, as a result of which further time, into March 2008, is requested. And granted.
“Durchhalteparolen?” Calls to stay the course. Berlin, 1945? I don’t know. But, listening to General Petraeus from my perch at Haji’s smoke joint across from the heavily fortified “Green Zone,” this aberration along the Babylonian skyline, just waiting to be stormed, I sense what the soldiers of the German sixth Army under General Paulus at Stalingrad must have felt during the last days of that ill-fated battle, listening to Herr Goebbels proclaim victory to be around the corner. And they claim history does not repeat itself.
The son and grandson of German officers, myself in the active reserves, I mean no disrespect to the highly-decorated General Officer. But, ambiguity in language, on top of overall obfuscation and evasiveness, continue to cloud what exactly the General said versus meant to say, and whether he meant what he did say. Proving that assessing success versus failure of the BSP depends on valuation of advances on objectives over goals as a function of cost/ benefit attached to implementing modalities.
Were success to be defined as advancing a goal other that the one originally suggested in an area other than the one originally targeted, while altogether failing to advance the larger objective then, in the words of Sheik Ali Al-Muthaba, the senior commander of the Political-Military Affairs and Special Operations Command of the Jaish-al-Mehdi, the military wing of the Sadrist Movement, “the surge could be called a smashing success.”
With the BSP failing its political objective to provide a breathing space for the central government, under an indecisive Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to advance national reconciliation, the government being eroded between internal and external strife, while overall security has not improved, I ask the loquacious Sheik Ali about his most stunning assessment over breakfast at his fortified residence in Sadr City, as Naseer, the embodiment of the devoted manservant, always felt but not seen, busies himself to get his Master’s soft-boiled eggs just right. It is interesting to observe how communication between the two is nearly completely non-verbal.
“You will recall that I state, ‘Now that we are “agreed to call” the BSP a smashing success’, …” a grinning Sheik Ali responds, resplendent in white pants and red silken smoking jacket, as he spreads his Melba toast with Fartnum and Mason’s finest orange marmalade. An Anglophile in the finest Somerset Maugham tradition, “the Resident” would come to the learned mind, Sheik Ali’s routine calls for receipt, on a bi-weekly basis, of what he calls his care package from London, sent along by friends at the Royal Overseas League.
“Well, Sheik Ali, is it, or is it not,” I press the point, not wanting to stress, too much, a contradiction in his public statements on the subject.
“My dear Andreas, contrary to civilian life, in times of war, as you will have learned from your distinguished grandfather, failure and success, defeat and victory, are not opposites, let alone flip sides of the coin,” he says, energetically, as he refreshes my demi-tasse of vanilla-scented Turkish coffee. Sheik Ali’s Turkish liaison officer, who joins us for part of an extended session to brief on Turkey’s cross-border shelling into the Kurdish Autonomous Region, had it shipped from Ankara. “But, rather stages on a continuum, keeping one in near perpetual animated suspension of finding the ambiguity of the hour resolve itself in historic certainty. That, however, requires time and detachment, neither of which we have on the battlefield.”
“The security situation has not improved, significantly,” I retort, not permitting him to get away with customary obfuscation, “certainly not in the perception of the public. There is no civic life, neither the Government nor the Iraqi State are functioning. The military track, almost exclusively shouldered by the Americans, outruns the political track, to the point, where the Iraqi political leadership now openly acknowledges that national reconciliation is unattainable. And you speak of success,” I assert myself.
“Success defines as much a point in time, as it defines a process. In determining success versus failure of any undertaking we must always value the road traveled as a function of time, given the obstacles placed in our way.”
“What do you mean,” I inquire, not quite certain whether I am failing to appreciate the profundity of Sheik Ali’s statement, or catching on to the skilled tactician’s diplospeak.
“I would not for a moment want to recommend Bagdad as a great tourist destination. Not yet. But, in criticizing the lack of manifest progress in key areas, foremost the inability of the Government to provide basic social services to the people of Iraq, employment, education, sanitation, health care, above all, security, you mention the collapse of the Government’s political agenda, let us look to the silver lining,” he retorts, visibly eager to change the subject.
“Where?”
“In the ongoing battlefield re-alignment which, if permitted to be carried to term, in changing the battle’s cause will change its operant dynamic. In record time, JAM has been transformed from America’s ‘number one enemy’ to ‘an ally’ in restoring law and order to Iraq. The U.S. Army’s success in Bagdad in reigning in Al-Qaeda Mesopotamia and specialized units of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, targeting U.S. and Iraqi military and security forces, is also the success of JAM. Proving, as Professor George Schwab of City College of New York, a leading American state theoretician, states, today’s ‘enemy,’ unlike ‘the foe,’ who must be destroyed, can be an ally in “advance of the tactical,” even where, for now, “agreement on the strategic” must be kept in abeyance.”
Sheik Ali joyfully refers to the President’s address of 13 September 2007, in which, seconding General Petraeus’s determination that the surge has been a success and, with security said to be improving, Mr. Bush endorses phased and limited troop cuts, by summer 2008, to restore pre-surge forces levels.
“General Petraeus also recommends that in December we begin transitioning to the next phase of our strategy in Iraq,” states Mr. Bush. “As terrorists are defeated, civil society takes root and the Iraqis assume more control over their own security, our mission in Iraq will evolve. Over time, our troops will shift from leading operations, to partnering with Iraqi forces, and eventually to over watching these forces,” Mr. Bush continues.
“Redeployment without replacement, one of our key objectives is being met. A ‘smashing success.’ No need to gloat,” Sheik Ali smiles, a sense of quiet accomplishment reflected in the hand drawn inward, as he glances at overnight dispatches, sent in from the various JAM commands.
“JAM and the U.S. Army have taken each other’s measure, realizing that only together can we win. So victory has to be defined in a way, which makes it palatable to both parties. JAM will claim, the Americans are leaving, because they were defeated. The Americans will claim, because the job has been done. History will sort it all out. Remember Napoleon’s return/ retreat from Moscow. The one city, as your grandfather always pointed out, none of us ever took. Not the French. Nor the Germans. Was Napoleon returning, retreating, redeploying? The Russian campaign marked by the success of reaching Moscow, or the failure to hold Moscow? Failure or success? Victory or defeat? What does it really mean? Over time? As today’s victory turns into tomorrow’s defeat, and today’s defeat sets the stage for tomorrow’s victory. Is it not all in the mode of thinking, expressed in words, and to control the one is to define the other. In the end, the people believe what they want to believe and read in the papers.”
By proclaiming a ‘return on success,’ which makes troop cuts possible, and stating that “the more successful we are, the more American troops can return home,” the President underscores, Sheik Ali asserts, the efficacy of approach taken by JAM in support of BSP, in advance of improved security, as conducive to an early withdrawal of foreign forces. “It will remain incumbent upon JAM to maintain the level of cooperation with the United States Army towards that end.”
The United States Army stands assured of JAM’s continued full cooperation in advance of the report, which General Odierno will transmit to Washington in November. “The report will be positive,” Sheik Ali assures.
Continued JAM cooperation with the United States Army, beyond the six-month time frame, originally given in the order of 29 August 2007 for JAM to seize military operations, is expected to impact positively upon the President’s evolving thinking on how, medium-term, to adjust the strategy to the emerging military and political realities on the ground. “We have favorably noted the U.S. Army’s cooperation with JAM in Western Bagdad, and beyond Bagdad, and have indicated our preparedness to extend the order and to expand the level of military and political cooperation.”
Sheik Ali grudgingly acknowledges a certain politicization of discourse on the military conduct of the war, but dismisses undue particularization as ill-informed on account of the political being indissoluble from the military. “We like to think that the political can be dissociated from the military and, perhaps, in war, one may want to strive in that direction. But, in the end, it’s the military, which serves the political and not the other way around, and that changes the equation, does it not,” he quizzes me while, true to a certain autocratic streak, not awaiting an answer.
“We can live with an ambitious reading of the situation on the ground, we even support such ambition, because BSP success, real or perceived and, given the ‘Fog of War,’ who is to say what’s real or perceived, will provide the basis for a graceful ‘re-deployment without replacement’ by summer 2008, with a gradual phase-out through April 2009, with a residual force into 2010/2012.”
Sadrists, he continues, do not seek an immediate, nor precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces, nor even consider it desirable, presupposing assurances that they will be withdrawn, eventually. Sheik Ali discourages unnecessary talk about a “long-term security arrangement” as disquieting to Iraqi nationalists.
“The surge remains a hotchpotch of tactics, rather than sound strategy based on the reality of the Iraqi body politic,” he asserts. “It’s a chimera, make believe. There is no real progress here. No real perspective. The issue is no longer how to win, but how to avoid outright defeat. At last, that reality is beginning to sink in. President Bush’s desire to play for time so that the war effort not collapse on his watch, runs along with our need to play for time, because, to some extent, in some areas, we are simply not ready for the government takeover. The stalemate, which defines the war effort, at this point in time, unfortunately, plays to advantage of key constituencies, external and internal to Iraq.”
Sheik Ali calls on Americans “to appreciate that although of import to winning the war in Iraq, success or failure in the Battle for Bagdad will not, on its own, prove decisive in changing the winds of war. The effort must be expanded to the provinces and that can only be accomplished, together, in cooperation with Shia militias and Sunni insurgency.”
Sheik Ali questions, whether either Americans or Iraqis have time and capacity left to wage the war. “I am concerned what happens, when we catch on.” He welcomes the change in attitude on the part of the U.S. Government to enlist extremists. The U.S. Army’s willingness and ability to enlist Shia militias and Sunni insurgent groups in the defense of Iraq is the singular most significant development to emanate from BSP success, he asserts.
“Extremists are outflanked at the far-end, not the near-end. As again in evidence in the Memorandum of Agreement of 6 October 2007, reached between the Hoyatoleslam Moqtadir al-Sadar and Dr. Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, in which the two leaders set forth a series of principles for coordinated direct action, with the goal of reigning in rogue Shia militia elements.”
The approach now taken mirrors the one, which Sheik Ali first outlined in 2005 and which forms the basis for JAM’s ongoing efforts within the Ninneveh process. As he wrote in “Wooing the insurgents,” UPI Outside View Commentary, 29 November 2005: “Enlisting nationalist elements of the insurgency into the domestic political process seems like the best hope to improve Iraq’s internal security situation and thence make possible the withdrawal of “all foreign forces” and ---the ultimate goal--- the restoration of full sovereignty.”
“As yet, we must connect the unity efforts on the Shia side to the unity efforts on the Sunni side, while connecting the military track to a political track. Intra-sectarian amalgamation will lend itself to inter-sectarian alignment, in advance of common objectives and goals on a broad range of issues, where positions converge and mutual interest, the survival of Iraq, intersects.”
Sheik Ali points out that the Hoyatoleslam welcomes an increased UN political role in Iraq and hopes for the new French diplomacy to lend support to ongoing efforts to jumpstart the non-existent process for national reconciliation, external to government, at the nexus between the governmental and non-governmental, in furtherance of a national accord, to which insurgents and militia, alike, can subscribe to.
“It is within this context that the Summit of Militia Leaders, envisioned by the Hoyatoleslam, takes on added importance as a necessary antecedent to the national reconciliation conference,” Sheik Ali asserts. “At the summit, militia and insurgent leaders should agree to an interim cessation of hostilities, with the objective of creating the political climate for conciliation, in which advance work on the agenda for the national reconciliation conference can proceed. Militia and insurgency should be enlisted to help enforce the interim ceasefire, with the objective of improving the overall security situation. JAM stands ready to assist in this effort.”
As he reflects on the wider war beyond Iraq, Sheik Ali calls for creative thinking as to what to do with AQ/M in the long-term “JAM is fully committed to confronting AQ/M head on and our cooperation in this regard, as in evidence in ongoing special operations, where we have, in part, provided actionable battlefield intel to the Americans, may be counted on,” he states.
And yet, he does not believe that, not unlike Shia militias and Sunni insurgency, AQ/M will be defeated on the battlefield, alone. “The resolution is to be found in the realm of the political. I firmly believe that AQ/M must be engaged along lines similar to those, which warrant engagement of militias and insurgents. Unfortunately, I have no takers for my proposition in this regard.”
“What are you proposing, Sheik Ali,” I quiz him one night, as, against the security detail’s expressed concerns, we take a long after dinner walk down the Tigris, the veil of the afternoon’s evaporating rain bouncing off a half moon, immersing Iraq’s ancient Capital in semi-illumination.
“A wedge must be driven between those elements of AQ/M, who are Iraqi nationals versus those who are not, those willing to lay down their arms and to join the democratic process and those not willing. That could enable us to drive a wedge internal to AQ/M and between AQ/M and AQ/Central, especially should an AQ/M, re-configured, be eligible for participation in the post-Liberation political process.”
“A political role for Al-Qaeda,” I mutter in disbelief.
“I do not see what fault line, other than Iraqi versus non-Iraqi, can be drawn, integral to national reconciliation,” states Sheik Ali.
He calls for those members of AQ/M, nationals of Iraq, willing to lay down their arms and to join the democratic process, to be eligible for the general and blanket amnesty which, following national accord, will have to be available to all Iraqis. Decrying the lack of progress on amnesty, Sheik Ali stresses its import integral to successful post-national accord Demobilization, Decommissioning and Rehabilitation of Combatants.
“Would getting AQ/M to split from AQ/Central not constitute a strategic defeat for AQ/Central? And could this not help our juxtaposition in the larger war?”
In the end, he states, AQ/Central shall be defeated, when a new generation of AQ leaders will realize the futility of armed struggle in advance of political goals. Asked whether he is serious about a future political role for AQ he deflects by referring to the efforts of Mr. Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan. “Look to what President Karzai is attempting to do with the Taliban to bring stability to Afghanistan. Do we really believe we are going to outgun AQ? They do have the home advantage.”
Sheik Ali declines to confirm persistent rumors that he has met with Abu-Ayeeb al-Masri, the AQ/M leader, but acknowledges that he is in discreet contact with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two AQ Leader.
“I am not proposing to take these chaps to the Club for dinner. I am proposing to find out whether it’s feasible and desirable to get the one to break from the other. We will have Osama’s head the day one of his closest brethren realizes it no longer serves a purpose to the Movement. Isn’t that how it worked with Judas?”
Sheik Ali states that as part of the “entente cordiale” in play between JAM and the United States Army since BSP inception, JAM will continue, quietly, to help the U.S. Army put on the fig-leaf of success, as everything must be done to deflect away from the U.S. Army. The closer the level of cooperation, the stronger the need to deflect, he argues.
Although JAM offensive military operations have been frozen, special operations, in particular, integral to JAM’s dual-encirclement strategy, continue unabated. The dual-encirclement strategy calling for direct measures, with the objective of outflanking the Americans in Bagdad by de-stabilizing the Northern Kurdish and Southern Shia regions. “The greater the instability across country, the stronger the utility of JAM to the U.S. Army. Remember how Frederick the Great, at Leuthen, 250 years ago this coming 5th December, forced the Austrians to thin out, thereby giving the much smaller Prussian forces the opportunity of circumnavigation and attack from the rear,” Sheik Ali states, as ever his thinking steeped in historic analogies. “I am counting on the Turks and hope that on 5th December the Chorale of Leuthen, sung by the victorious Prussians, will become the Chorale of Babylon, sung by the victorious men of the Army of the Mehdi.”
Like the Prussians and the Austrians during the war of 1866, JAM and the U.S. Army have bigger enemies to fight, so he says. “The larger war is beyond the storm clouds gathering as, together, we are getting ready to take on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.”
Sadrists take strongest exception to specialized units of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, operating on Iraqi territory, in flagrant violation of Iraqi sovereignty and independence. “We were first, on 26 June 2007, in advising that specialized units of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are openly operating in Southern Iraq. We do consider measures taken by specialized units of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Iraqi territory acts of terrorism!”
JAM continues to cooperate with U.S. and Iraqi military and security forces in eliminating specialized units of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran operating outside the law on the territory of Iraq! “It is with that in mind that, yet again, earlier this month we helped facilitate the U.S. strike against Iranian special forces in Sadr City, complicit in the abduction of five British nationals. And it is, with that in mind that we will help in providing the smoking gun: hard evidence of Iran arming rogue Shia militias against the U.S. Army,” Sheik Ali asserts.
“President Bush has indicated, privately, “a” willingness “to adjust” his war plan to reflect the emerging post-surge military and political realities,” Sheik Ali states. “Within this context, I like to think of the proposed “political arrangement” with the Hoyatolelsalm.”
Sheik Ali does not believe that now is the time to go wobbly on the President’s commitment to enlarge the strategic space for Democracy, not in Iraq, nor throughout the Middle East, but to enlist the Religious in its Advance! “He will gain the upper hand, who succeeds in advancing his own objectives in furtherance of the President’s objectives. A zero sum will prove untenable.”
Discussing the larger war another night with senior JAM combatant commanders and Iraqi General Staff officers, as well as his Turkish and Israeli liaison officers, Sheik Ali states, “The currents of change are sweeping all across the seven Seas, nowhere more forcefully as where the water seems the calmest.”
That night, dining alfresco on the terrace of “Villa Zarathustra,” Sheik Ali’s official residence in Sadr City, illuminated by torches, under a bedouin canapé-turned-tent, the clerestory of its nave proving a prominent spot for Sheik Ali’s insignia, the comforting sound of the Great Elector’s Cavalry March and other Prussian marches protruding from the darkened drawing room, we are also joined by a deputation of German Rightists, members of the “Patriotic Front New Germany,” an umbrella organization of German patriots. “One does what one can for the comrades,” Sheik Ali shrugs off my surprise.
“Let them get some field experience. It’s good to know German patriots in solidarity with Iraqi patriots. Together we stand,” he asserts in a mannerism reminiscent of another German leader, whose name escapes me for now. The leader of the group pressing the senior commander, whose exploits are beginning to gain him some standing among his peers in Germany, to revisit the invitation to address a forthcoming rally in Eastern Germany, which Sheik Ali turned down.
“For as long as German patriots are not wiling to make a clear break with nationalism and National Socialism, there is no place for me in the Movement,” he asserts, now at near full attention, cutting an elegant figure in his white mess dress, offset by black pants, as he relieves a white-gloved Naseer of a decanter of Berry Brothers and Rudd Claret. “Nothing wrong with Fascism, everything wrong with National Socialism,” he professes, as he passes the Cubans along. “There is no future in nationalism.”
I am inclined not to inquire into the dialectic, he is attempting, but can’t resist, the air lending itself to a new self-assertiveness. “Whatever is the difference between a patriot and a nationalist.”
“A patriot is someone, who loves his own country, a nationalist someone, who loves his country at the expense of someone else’s. I surrender myself in the one, abhor the other,” Sheik Ali retorts, briskly, visibly enjoying a fine glass of what he calls grape juice. Special dispensation, he assures.
Sheik Ali’s dinner parties have an air of the sacral, as if attending a solemn mass, choreographed to the finest detail, the mere culinary experience being elevated to the metaphysical, an occasion, not lost on those asked to join in its celebration. “With Iraqi streets awash in those, who have died and those about to die, all I can promise my men is that they’ll die on a full stomach. After the benediction. I consider it uncivilized to finish dinner, before the benediction. Or, for that matter, to die before the benediction.”
A tradition he picked up during a brief stint in the French Foreign Legion in 1984, I learn.
“Fascism defines a certain relationship between the State and the citizen, inclusive by vocation, broad in application, call it compassionate conservatism. A social contract based on no citizen left behind, cradle to grave. National Socialism denied all that to entire segments of our people. I cannot, by God, stand for that.”
“What about the Aryan race,” inquires one of his younger disciples, his eyes fixed on the leader.
“There you go again, comrade,” an irritated Sheik Ali chides his pupil, “get that whole set of vocabulary out of your mind, along with the underlying line of thinking. The New Germany shall not be based on race, but the true content of the German character, no matter what color skin. Germanism is to be based on duty, honor, country. Fortitude of character, the mind mitigated by the heart, in the soul revealed.”
“The German soul,” the Israeli liaison officer moans, semi-quietly.
“Nouri, the day German patriots permitted themselves to turn on German Jewry marked the beginning of the end. It has taken us 60 years to make our way back from that end and, still, the “Thousand Year Reich” endures, in a thousand years of shame. Yet, at last, we have you back, where you belong, in Berlin. And it’s good to have you back. All good.”
The comrades from Germany, unaware that Nouri was not only an Israeli of German parentage. but an IDF officer, show their astonishment.
“You tell the comrades, the day they are willing to embrace my Israeli, Turkish and African brothers as co-equals, Christian, Jew, Black, White, or Green, for that matter, the day they are willing to look forward, rather than backward, marks the day I’ll come to address them.”
Expanding on his vision, what he calls “My Journey,” Sheik Ali stresses the need to build bridges of understanding, cross-culturally, cross-ethnic, cross-religious, in advance of common objectives and goals. The movement, he asserts, must be positioned in the realm of the attainable, the feasible, rather than merely the desirable.
“Empowerment,” he exclaims, emphatically, visibly pleased with his bravura performance, the guests glued to their chairs. “Empowerment in advance of freedom and liberty, in all corners of the globe, with the Religious advancing the Democratic, will arise no sooner than moribund post-Colonial authoritarian regimes have been enabled to collapse. That will be our hour. Towards that end, the Global War may prove a necessary catalyst in transforming the post World War-II era of middle class accommodation, the same way that the Great War (1914-1918) led to the demise of the order of Vienna.” (1815)
“But does that not fly in the face of key tenets of the movement,” inquires one of the foot soldiers from Sachsen-Anhalt, who briefly sat ion the State Legislature for the Neo-Nazi Party.
“Your movement. Yesterday’s movement. Not mine. Tomorrow’s movement. To become palatable the Movement’s past and future must merge in the present and that necessitates a break with outdated approaches. We need new thinking. Just like our Iraqi cousins need new thinking. That’s why we are here. Remember, he who controls thinking controls action. We must redefine our actions within newly redefined terminology,” Sheik Ali states.
“In a way, Muth-Pasha, that’s what Kemal Atatuerk had to do,” interjects the Turkish Army liaison officer who, tall, light featured and extremely well-built, could just as well have passed for German. Born in Germany to a Turkish father and a German mother, Sheik Ali is fond of pointing to him as the embodiment of the type of new German, he sees central to Germany’s future. “The merging of the past and the future in the present. Very inspired.”
As we retire to the candle-lit drawing room for after-dinner white port, under the ever watchful eyes of Sheik Ali’s Mehdi storm troopers, he makes fleeting comment of the Kalashnikovs, the famous General M. K. Kalashnikov serving on Mr. Muth’s Eminent Persons Group.
“To be won, the global war must be re-cast as a campaign for liberation and empowerment, with goal-oriented action to be based on advance of the political and the religious,” he continues. Towards that end, “the war’s objectives and goals must be re-defined, away from current thinking in terms of counter-terrorism, but rather in furtherance of an alliance for reason, its means to be found in the realm of the political, not the military.”
Sheik Ali regrets that “in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, we permitted ourselves to be rushed to arms, without a clear understanding of the enemy, the threats, the strategy. “As a result of not fully appreciating the threat, early success in Afghanistan permitted some to divert the effort to Iraq. Now, time is approaching to refocus on the larger conflict, beyond Iraq, the conflict’s ideological/ intellectual confrontation,” he states.
Sheik Ali sees historic parallels between the American War of Independence and the Iraqi Freedom Struggle. “As a nation borne of the strife to rid herself of the yoke of Colonial oppression, I would hope for consideration of the free will exercise of a free people,” he states. “As I look at the Iraqi militiaman of 2007, I see the American militiaman of 1776. Patriots, both.”
Sheik Ali states that “since the earliest days of the American Republic, the American citizen-soldier has been in the front lines of the Nation’s defense. Whether as an irregular, a militiaman, or a regular, a Guardsman, when duty called to defend freedom and liberty, he was there. His name forever indelibly inscribed on the Nation’s golden scroll of honor, the American Patriot rests assured of his revered place d’honneur in the Pantheon of American Greats.”
Sheik Ali states that, “as they travel along the road to self-discovery, Iraqis are testing whether the promise of 1776 holds true today, as it did, then. And whether Mr. Jefferson’s proposition to Americans that, as a “People, we are endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness,” manifests American exceptionalism, or the World’s destiny.”
Sheik Ali asserts that on the great issue of our day, Advance of Democracy, he stands with President Bush, when he assures us that the promise of 1776 holds true for all, who seek it.
“Today, on the far-flung battlefields of a Global War, that assertion is being challenged,” Sheik Ali states. “Nowhere more visibly, more brutally than on the streets of Iraq, where the few strive to deny the promise of 1776 to the many. Were it not for the American Patriot, alongside his Iraqi counterpart, to take up the challenge,” he continues.
“We are engaged in a great battle of that war: the Battle for Bagdad. A battle, which may prove as decisive for Iraqi Independence, as the Battle of Kings Mountain proved for American Independence,” he asserts.
“The American Patriot experience serves as an inspiration in transforming the Iraqi militia experience,” Sheik Ali says. “The objectives, for which many a militiaman and insurgent fights, are not, as some would have it, defined by the East-West difference,” he continues, “but spring from internal to the Middle East. If we look at the leadership of militias and insurgency, we find many a son of the upper classes, in open rebellion against their parents, the corruption and decadence, for which they stand. Islamic Revivalism, National Liberation, Empowerment, and Nationalism are currents in a sea of change.”
“Take, for example, the House of Saud, apart from the “Cosa Nostra” the world’s singular biggest criminal conspiracy,” Sheik Ali asserts, “financing, aiding and abetting, some of the most virulently militant Sunni fanatics, for no reason other than to maintain an unjust, but self-serving political order under the guise of protecting the faith. I say, heads off.”
A visibly energized Sheik Ali continues, “I am delighted that, at last, the 9/11 victims have a chance, in U.S. federal court, to follow the money trail, will say, into what bank accounts did the Bin-Laden Group transfer the cash, when cousin Osama was officially separated from the family? The financial dealings of the Bin-Ladens are inseparable from those of the Saudi Royal family. I want to state, for the record, that OBL has never been fully separated from the family, that, to this day, the family maintains discreet contact and that senior members of the Saudi Royal family are keyed in, with funds going from Saudi intelligence to Pakistani intelligence to keep him out of sight. That’s, why Osama continues to elude capture.”
With Nouri, the IDF liaison officer nodding in approval, Sheik Ali points to Saudi Arabia’s proxy war in Iraq as evidence for his assertion that corrupt Sunni regimes abuse the religious in advance of the political for purpose of self-preservation. “The House of Saud is not fighting for the faith, but survival. Before this conflict is over, they will be gone and, with them out of the picture, the Middle East will be transformed. The Saudis know that once Shiaism is enabled to bring a new enlightenment to the rule of Wahabiism, and Sunni autocracy in general, the summer residences in Marbella turn into permanent lodgings.”
As Naseer passes the port for yet another round of now spirited conversation, Lah’s gildedness beginning to yield to the silveriness of Rah, Ali Mohammed, Sheik Ali’s dapper aide-de-suite, announces a surprise visit by Mr. Ammar al-Hakim, eldest son of and heir-apparent to Dr. Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, whose military wing, the BADR organization, was vying with Sheik Ali’s Mehdi Army for control of Basra. Until Dr. Hakim and Moqtadr al-Sadr, who are related by marriage, Mrs. Haim being an al-Sadr, opted to align in advance of the Iraqi national interest. While the agreement for the two militias not to attack each other anymore seems to be holding, sharp differences of positions persist on the future of Iraq, impeding Sheik Ali’s efforts to align the Sadrist Movement and SIIC in a power bloc, in advance of the Government of National Salvation.
“Ah, true to form, I can see, an evening of Christian fellowship,” the younger Mr. Hakim comments, mischievously, on the spirits permeating the air, as he extends a warm embrace to Sheik Ali.
“Salam aleikum, my Brother,” an excited Sheik Ali, visibly pleased by his high guest’s surprise visit, returns the warmth of sentiment. “Come, meet my guests. We were just discussing your father’s inspired efforts to advance Shia unity.”
“Always the flatterer. I can tell why Mookie likes you. You will go far, my Brother.”
“One man’s flatterer is another man’s devoted servant,” Sheik Ali replies, displaying his best version of humility. “Am I to be criticized for the Christian virtue of humility, when confronting greatness?”
“But, off course not,” Mr. Hakim retreats. “You are pleasing to the Greats. That is your strength. That’s why we keep you around.”
“In serviando consumor,” (Latin: In Serving, I consume myself) the Papist replies. “We have the saying that if Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great had made love, instead of war, the world would look different. The same can be said about the al-Hakims and the al-Sadr’s and Iraq,” Sheik Ali muses.
“Insha’ Allah, we’ll see,” a bemused young Mr. Hakim responds. “One step at a time. You are pushing too hard. It’s the Christian in you.”
“May I offer you some minted tea and Qatayef,” a solicitous Sheik Ali inquires, passing the silver tray of special Ramadanian treats, baked by Nasser’s mother for the great commander. Relinquishing his seat, he requests his honored guest to provide a most fascinating overview of the Iraqi situation.
“Iraq, … the reality and the vision, …,” a reflective Mr. Hakim contemplates his thoughts. “What is Iraq, … a country divided by a common religion. The complexity of the issues confronting us as much a function of the religious, as of the political. Advance of the one will lend guide to the other.”
Mr. Hakim expands on the SIIC vision for Iraq as an Islamic State, based on Shia empowerment, including Sharia law. He strongly supports a Federal structure for Iraq, even where that might lead to partition, an issue of great contention between the elder Mr. Hakim and Mr. al-Sadr.
“I share Sheik Ali’s view that a plebiscite may prove inevitable,” Mr. Hakim says. “Let Iraqis decide the future of Iraq. Why hold together, against will, what does not want to hold together?”
Mr. Hakim seems to share Sheik Ali’s sense of Iraq at the cusp of Revolution. “A revolution, perhaps, as significant to the advance of the human experience as the American and French Revolutions,” states Sheik Ali. A revolution, both agree, directed more inward than outward.
Both lament that to date we have not come to terms with the winds of change. “If only the West came to terms with the Shiaism and its position within the Middle East,” says Mr. Hakim. A sentiment echoed by Sheik Ali who states, “As Westerners, we come into the gage because of our support for corrupt and decadent regimes. I advocate in favor of our support for the revolutionary potential of the masses, contra the established order, which does not serve the people.”
A sentiment echoed by Mr. Hakim. It defies explanation that Sadrists, who are the non-establishment protagonists of the disenfranchised lower classes, do not favor revolution, as opposed to Mr. Hakim’s supporters, who are the status-quo protagonists of the established order and power elite, who do.
I am not able to discern if that’s because of a differential, which Sheik Ali and Mr. Hakim seem to draw between the political and religious dimensions of the Iraqi Revolution. Nor am I quire capable to discern, whether the two understand each other so well as to require few words to be spoken between them, or if they just speak past each other. A lot seems coded language.
“Let the Colonial order collapse, I say. With dignity. It has served its time,” Sheik Ali says. “Shia Iraq’s future relations with the West will be defined by whether it came about with Western support. Or, against. Just as mending the Shia-Sunni rift will depend, in part, on whether Shia Iraq will have come about with or without Sunni support.” A sentiment shared by the soft-spoken Mr. Hakim, who strikes me amazingly deferential to the German noble, who commands the situation.
Sheik Ali and Mr. Hakim are proud of the quiet progress being made between Sadrists and SIIC. They view this effort as central to helping bring about a new Parliamentary majority in advance of a new Government. Also, they view these efforts integral to Sheik Ali’s efforts of aligning both with the United States Army. These efforts having been in the forefront of Sheik Ali’s yearlong mission, since assuming command in January. Mr. Hakim and Sheik Ali are agreed on the need to expand on the agreement of 6 October 2007.
“It is incumbent on the Sadrist and SIIC leadership to seize the moment and to push for the convening of the Summit of Militia Leaders,” Sheik Ali asserts.
“First, we must get our own house in order and that presupposes political cooperation beyond the military. And your man is blocking that.”
“Because your father has unrealistic demands on him,” Sheik Ali retorts, the demeanor suddenly stern.
“Then deal with me.”
“I am,” Sheik Ali replies.
“Mookie is a dreamer. Always has been. Does he not see the camel’s back is broken?”
“Perhaps, but he also sees the camel’s nose rising under the bedouin’s tent. A dreamer. A visionary. A man of commitment. And his commitment is to Iraq. Unlike others, he never left Iraq for the safe-heaven, overseas.”
As the conversation gradually shifts to Iran, Sheik Ali impresses upon Mr. Hakim the need for Iraq to take a historic decision: to assert herself over Iran. “The reality. And the vision. Iraq is confronting enemies greater than self.”
“I am an Iraqi. I am a Shia. How am I to value the one over the other,” Mr. Hakim asks, as if searching for guidance from the German noble.
“Shia Iraq can only come to the fore, once the question of eminent domain with Iran has been settled,” Sheik Ali asserts. “And that should be done sooner rather than later. You must come out of under domination by your Iranian brothers. I am, not suggesting to annihilate them. Just put them in their place.”
“Shia Iraq has few natural allies,” Mr. Hakim responds. “You yourself are flirting with Tehran.”
“Nothing wrong with a good summer flirt. But come fall, and we are back home, we have bigger issues to tend to, do we not?”
“Perhaps.”
Nouri, the IDF liaison officer, quizzes Mr. Hakim on Iran’s nuclear intentions.
“As far as we can tell, it’s all make belief,” Mr. Hakim responds. “They are using the nuclear issue as a political tool to extract economic concessions. There is some serious internal power play at work on this one.”
“The West and Iraqis are tied in a single garment of mutuality, marked by the commonality of shared objectives and goals, in advance of common interests,” Sheik Ali interjects. “That holds especially true for the threat emanating to common interests from the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he states, pointing to a threat to Iraq, the Middle East, the world.
“I am a man of peace, but I shall not shrink from my responsibility to argue in favor of war, if then, in defense of the national interest, war is to be our destiny. While war must always be the last option it is, contrary to what others may believe, on occasion, not the worst option.”
Sheik Ali does not want to confirm that he is quietly advocating a widening of the war both, internal and external to Iraq. Internal to Iraq, against rogue Shia militias and Sunni insurgents, unwilling to lay down their arms and to join the democratic process, and contra AQ/M. External to Iraq, contra Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and, whoever is found to intervene in the internal affairs of post-Liberation Iraq.
“I believe in a “total war concept,” the use of maximum force in advance of clear-cut and attainable strategic objectives in the near-term. Rather than application of proportional force in advance of the tactical in the long-term. My approach to warfare is not unlike my approach to cooking, Don’t fiddle with the food, make a meal of it. Given the option between a brutal, but short, swift and decisive conflagration versus a sanitized, but long, indecisive and inconclusive conflagration, I opt for the former.”
Sheik Ali does confirm that a new JAM command is being stood up along the Eastern frontier with Iran, in part to help with protecting Iraq against Iranian incursions or any post-U.S. attack invasion by Iranian forces. He voices his hope to coordinate this effort with BADR. “We are placing premium on U.S. and British Forces protection.”
“We have told Tehran to respect Iraqi sovereignty,” Mr. Hakim asserts. “We can work on protecting Iraq’s national interest.”
At the same time, JAM special operations units are said to be operating in Iran to help with mapping potential targets and destabilizing the Government by rousing the faithful in the South. Efforts to enlist Iraq’s Kurds in common cause, with the objective of enlisting Iranian Kurds, in advance of a Northern front, are said to remain inconclusive. I could elicit from Sheik Ali that planning calls for Tehran to be squashed between a coordinated uprising in the North and the South, supported by U.S. Air Power.
JAM/U.S. Army military cooperation will continue, with its scope being expanded. “To the contrary of evolving thinking, at this stage of public opinion going against the surge, a visible battlefield victory is needed. JAM stands ready to help make this happen in Bagdad. I continue to argue in favor of coordinated “direct measures” against “key targets.” The bulk of the violence, both insurgent and sectarian, continues to be inflicted by an identifiable cabal, which can be rendered “neutral. And JAM Special Operations Units, augmented by some of the previous regime’s finest and cooperating with Iraqi Special Forces, stand uniquely prepared and willing to accomplish that objective.”
JAM is committed to help the U.S. Army achieve a tactical battlefield victory in advance of BSP to order to help the President gain breezing space, to make the necessary adjustments and to soften the blow of defeat. “Our common objectives can be achieved in the 18-to-24 month time-frame, now under consideration. There is further potential for a convergence of views on the role, which a united democratic Iraq, at peace with self and her neighbors can play as an ally on the War on Terrorism. It should be underscored that the U.S. vision for the New Iraq and the Sadrist vision for the New Iraq are much closer in line than is appreciated.”
Sheik Ali asserts that Sadrists support the calls for an end to sectarian killings, the disarmament of militias and an equitable distribution of oil-revenue, presupposing that the constructive parallelism between non-interference by outside powers/ withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, restoration of public order/ sovereignty and self-governance be respected and appreciated. Mr. Hakim echoes these sentiments, expressing hope that forthcoming political talks between the elders yield a goal-orienetd Programme of Action towards that end.
Sheik Ali hopes for a cessation of hostilities to be advanced concomitant to the phased redeployment of U.S. forces, as both a precondition for and function of the fledgling process for national reconciliation, in advance of a national accord on all principles, political and religious, which are to govern the new Iraq. Towards that end, he considers support for the emerging Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation of critical import.
He points out that the Hoyatoleslam has called for a demilitarization of the strategy, with set deadlines for immediate re-deployment (within 180 days, i.e. spring 2008) and near-term withdrawal. (within 540 days, i.e. 9 April 2009) Replacing departing troops with militias and insurgents, amenable to political compromise and re-configuration under government control either, at the level of the central government or the provincial level. He encourages the recall of eligible soldiers of the Iraqi Army, in particular Specialized Republican Guard.
At the same time, Sheik Ali states that the Hoyatoleslam aims to advance cross-sectarian political and militia/ insurgency cooperation in furtherance of common cause. With the future of Iraq resting with the people of Iraq, and with them alone, ongoing efforts aimed at Parliamentary re-alignment, with the objective of forming a National Salvation Government, capable and willing to govern, to be led by a competent and willing Prime Minister, committed to the advance of National Accord both, programmatically and operationally, are being augmented. It is hoped, so Sheik Ali, that a governing coalition can be brought about, which has the benchmarks as an integral part of the coalition agreement.
“It will be critical for the coalition agreement to enshrine the Hoyatoleslam’s call for a “New Contract for All Iraqis:” to be based on Hope, Tolerance, Nonviolence, Conciliation and Unity.”
Sadrists envision two processes: internal to Iraq, a national reconciliation process, to be based on a national reconciliation (all party) conference, to which all stakeholders in the Iraqi body politic are to be invited both, non-governmental and governmental. To be preceded by the Summit of Militia Leaders. It is in fusing the two, where short-term, Sheik Ali sees prospect for improving Iraq’s security situation.
He thinks that an Eminent Persons Group, under the patronage of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, perhaps co-chaired by the Hoyatoleslam, the younger Mr. Hakim or Jalal al-Deen al-Saghir from the Shia side and Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, Harith Sulayman al-Dhari or Mahmoud al-Sumaydai from the Sunni side, and with its members to be drawn from the political and religious leadership of all constituent groups of the Iraqi body politic subscribing to the national accord, including Christians, could help steer post-Conference follow-up and follow-on.
External to Iraq, the Sadrist game plan envisions an international conference in support of Iraq’s internal efforts, which could address Iraq's juxtaposition within the Middle East, security assurances and economic development. The Compact, adjusted accordingly, may prove a viable venue, Sheik Ali thinks.
“The sole purpose of the conference to augment the process, internal to Iraq,” he says. “And yet, legitimate concerns of Iraq's neighbors could be addressed, perhaps better within the larger international framework, rather than merely within the regional. Yet, the Iraq Question must not be internationalized, but internalized. Iraq for the Iraqis.”
Sheik Ali holds that somewhere between the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq, regular and irregular, and non-intervention by outside powers an inspired diplomacy will find the historic compromise to the Iraq quagmire.
The proposed conference could, he states, advance the operant dynamic/ linkage between withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, and non-interference by outside powers, into which U.S. redeployment/ withdrawal can be absorbed. Getting Iran/ Syria to commit not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq may be among the few long-term objectives, U.S. diplomacy can achieve, short-term. “Within this context, the potential role of UN peacekeeping should be looked at further,” Sheik Ali says.
A Contact Group, to be comprised of the UN, EU, OIC, Arab League, the P-5, relevant and interested powers, could be envisioned to help steer conference follow-up and follow-on.
Sheik Ali holds that an Eminent Persons Group internal to Iraq and a Contact Group external to Iraq could provide a chapeau for the dual-track framework, with the objective of helping advance maximum coordination and harmonization of security in all its aspects. “If successful, the operant dynamic, inherent in the dual-track framework, could be considered for the convening of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) to explore vistas, venues and modalities to address and redress the gamut of political-military, economic and social issues, confronting the region. Such a bold initiative, however, would require willingness to proceed on Palestinian Statehood.”
Sheik Ali voices his optimism on Palestinian statehood, expressing his view that President Bush may think of himself as the “Godfather of the Palestinian State.”
Sheik Ali sees great potential for post-Liberation Iraqi diplomacy. There is, in advance of Iraq’s leading Middle East role, benefit to be derived from linking Iraq’s liberation struggle to the quest for Palestinian statehood, he thinks. “Liberation and Empowerment should be linked in advance of the Democratic. In Iraq. As in Palestine. As throughout the Middle East. We should position Shia Iraq in the forefront of an awakening pan-Arab nationalism. The President’s initiative on an international peace conference, with the objective of bringing about a Palestinian State, should be seen in this regard. We should support the effort and aim to link it up to a larger Middle East Conference a la CSCME.” Another brainchild, for which he has no takers. “Not yet,” he chuckles.
جميـــع حقـوق الطبع والنشر محفوظة لصوت العراق /
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