Keynote Address of Sheikh Ali al-Muthaba,
Senior Commander, Jaish-al-Mehdi,
before the Inter-Agency-Working-Group,
Department of State, Washington, DC, 27 March 2009
I shall speak in three parts: Part One, I shall pronounce nine key points, which set forth my carefully-considered positions on the War in Iraq, what I term the “Wider War,” i.e. How to confront Militant/ Political Islam, and what I term the “Greater War,” the threat perception emanating from Big Power involvement; Part Two, I shall expand on key points 1, 2, 3, and 9; Part Three, I shall provide an Iraq War Progress Report. The report is in follow-up to the Iraq Situation Interim Report, 19 July 2007. Part Four, I shall address myself on the Iraq Question, integral to the “Wider War,” while making passing reference to the “Greater War.”
I shall not address myself on key points 4 through 8, which go to the specificity of the Afghan Question, as it is external to my professional purview. Further, beyond the meta-conceptual, I shall not address myself on specific aspects of the “Wider War” and the “Greater War.”
PART ONE: the Key Points
To begin, I shall make the following nine KEY POINTS:
1. The War in Iraq is lost, with the United States military effort having failed to achieve its stated political objectives.
2. The U.S. and Allied response to Political Islam, awakening in countries around the world, is conceptually flawed due to a lack of understanding of its actors, goals, objectives and modalities.
3. The U.S. and Allied response to extremists is conceptually-flawed due to a lack of understanding of its actors, goals and modalities.
4. The U.S. and Allied effort in Afghanistan, as currently conceived, shall fail.
5. One should not be surprised if, following the NATO summit, President Karzai were to disallow further troop augmentation!
6. One should not be surprised by a heightening of tensions along the Line of Control! (India and Pakistan)
7. One should not be surprised by talks ongoing between Taliban, AQ, and others, with the objective of circumnavigating the U.S. and Allied war plan! It must be AQ’s and Taliban’s objective to destabilize Pakistan and to draw a weakened Pakistan into open confrontation with India, which will draw in the Big Powers. Coordinated efforts between JAM, Hezbollah, Hamas, Taliban, AQ are, as yet, not fully appreciated in their signal impact on the conduct of the war.
8. Key Points 4/5/6/7 should be expected to bring to bear considerable lateral pressures on US intentions. Bearing in mind that the objective of U.S. efforts is not Afghanistan, but Pakistan. And that heightening tensions in South Asia will further deflect from Iraq and the ME, which will please the Iranians and displease the Israelis. An Israel, displeased by the shift in emphasis on the war, plays to JAM advantage. Further discreet JAM-IDF cooperation will help deflect from heightening tensions with the al-Maliki Government and the Obama Administration. A further deterioration of Iraqi-Iranian relations will also play to advantage in this regard.
9. In the current climate, domestic and international, the U.S. and Allied Powers fail to deflect the threat perception emanating from the possibility of a “Greater War.” While not yet blowing, the Winds of War are gathering beyond the graying horizon. Let us not, in years to come, have to answer, “Why America Slept.”
PART TWO: Expanding on the Key Points
Key Point #1. The War in Iraq is lost, with the United States military effort having failed to achieve its stated political objectives.
In announcing “A New Way Forward,” 10 January 2007, President Bush stated: “to take the necessary military measures in order to improve the security situation to the point of enabling the PM to advance the necessary political measures in order to further the process of national reconciliation.”
National reconciliation remains as elusive in Iraq in 2009, as it was in 2007. Fundamental differences of opinion persist between Iraq’s constituent ethnic groups, Shia, Sunni, Kurd and Christian, in regards to Governance, what I have defined as the Iraq Question. While elections have taken place in January 2009, bearing in mind that less than half the electorate voted, along sectarian lines, provincial councils remain to be seated, pending the outcome of electoral challenges. Furthermore, at the Provincial level, we are confronting serious challenges to both, civilian and military authority, while the allocation of governmental function between Baghdad and the provinces remains unresolved. Both, a resolution to oil-revenue-sharing and the future status of Kirkuk will help tear Iraq apart. At Kirkuk, the Prime Minister was well advised to replace the 4th Division, mostly comprised of Kurds, with an all-Arab Division under Iraqi command! There has, to date, been no follow-up to the December 2006 national reconciliation conference. There is as little a national reconciliation process in Iraq, as there is a Middle East peace process.
At the same time, while overall violence affecting U.S. military and security personnel is down, and well below the radar of an American public turning away from the war, the overall security situation affecting Iraqis remains fragile, and that is understating it. As the National Command Authority has conceded, the level of violence in Iraq today is where it was following Iraq Liberation Day, 9 April 2003, and the insurgency gaining momentum that summer. Spring and Summer 2003 did not witness a secure, nor safe Iraq. Nor do we, this date, witness a safe and secure Iraq, where an improved security situation would lend itself to national reconciliation. Iraq’s military and security forces are just about capable to manage the water’s currents which, at any given time, anywhere across the country, can erupt in an avalanche of destruction. It is with that threat scenario in mind that I continue to argue in favor of clear lines of communications across the battlefield’s divide so that, together, we can work against those who remain intent on taking advantage of the weakness displayed at the center of Iraqi Governance.
As a senior commander of the Jaish-al-Mehdi, I support the ambitious take on a safe and secure Iraq, as perpetuation of this impression is the basis for your gracious exit. It is on that basis, that I was able to get JAM to go along with the entente, as embraced by the Bush Administration. But, let us be clear of the actual situation on the ground, as it will impact the post-redeployment political stage.
While having failed to achieve its stated political objectives, and I dare challenge the contention that you have achieved the military objective of securing Iraq, the modalities of U.S. tactical success in 2007 have been displaced. Additional U.S. forces, inserted into theatre under the surge, have been withdrawn. Further troop reductions are about to commence, with the British exit to be completed by end of April. Although overall violence is down sharply, attacks abound all around. Baghdad, Basra, Mosul are not what you would call safe cities by regional standards. At last, the National Command Authority has conceded that only half of Diyala province is under control. As the Sons of Iraq, whose willingness to turn against AQ/M greatly contributed to the perception of General Petraeus’s short-lived success, have begun to turn on the U.S. Already prompting a first revision to the 30 June 2009 timetable for withdrawal of ALL combat forces. Will you please, prior to announcing once again, Mission Accomplished, get your facts straight and at least strive for a perception in line with reality?
Of the three legs, on the basis of which the previous Administration could sell to the American people the chimera of success, only the third leg, the alignment of Jaish-al-Mehdi with the U.S. Army, remains standing. And truth be told, I take great pride in having helped bring that alignment about. It has been the privilege of my life to help the United States High Command do so. But, with the passage of time, as conditions change, the ability to preserve the entente will erode further.
Let there be no doubt. Were it not for the U.S. troop presence between the Sons of Iraq, whom you armed, and the Jaish-al-Mehdi, those weapons would now be in use. And they will be used, eventually, as I maintain that both the “Iraqi Civil War” and the “Great Iraqi Revolution” are inevitable. It is with that point in mind, that I cannot sufficiently strongly urge upon you to make every effort to reclaim the weapons you distributed. A robust DD&R programme, will be critical to maintaining peace, when, on the basis of the current planning, all U.S. forces shall be withdrawn by 31 December 2011.
Please note, the President’s plan is dependent on the SOFA referendum in summer and the national elections in December. I expect us to sail through both, but the sailing will not prove easy, yet again demonstrating the fraying in bilateral relations. It will prove more contentious than the SOFA talks. As the PM will have to play the nationalist card, contra-U.S.
I remain concerned that Iraqis have not come to the conclusion that the long end of the barrel of a gun does not lend itself to the long-term advance of political objectives. The Hezbollah and Hamas experiences would seem to speak to the contrary. At the same time, U.S. efforts to quarantine the war, i.e. to sanitize violence, have failed to shock and awe Iraqis into realizing the futility of armed struggle. That is where I continue to advocate for “Total War.” All-out conflagration. Given the choice between a drawn-out low intensity conflict, which remains inconclusive, versus a short, brutal but decisive war, one, which clears the deck for a new beginning out of the abyss of total destruction, (Berlin 1945 comes to mind) I must attest my strong support for the latter.
It is, within this context, that I respectfully object to the very goal of General Petraeus’ counter-insurgency doctrine, which strives to separate the populus from the war fighting parties. Separating the populus from the war, will unduly prolong the war. It is my contention that, just as the threat of nuclear annihilation kept the lid on conventional East-West confrontation during the Cold War, so the threat perception emanating from outright annihilation will shorten, not prolong, asymmetrical wars. That is why I disagree with the approach now to be taken by the U.S. towards the Taliban. Don’t cultivate moderate elements of the Taliban. Instead, cultivate the most extreme elements of the Taliban, amenable to cultivating under terms you can live with, and then let them cultivate those uncultivateable for you. That, usually, results in their elimination.
Key Point #2. The U.S. and Allied response to Political Islam, awakening in countries around the world, is conceptually flawed due to a lack of understanding of its actors, goals, objectives and modalities.
What we are witnessing in the Islamic world is the awakening of the disenfranchised lower classes. Disenfranchised in economic, political and religious terms. The mass revolutionary potential of the awakening lower classes being turned inward, against corrupt political elites, rather than outward, against us. And, yet, we support corrupt political elites against the awakening lower classes, yearning to be rid of the tyrant’s yoke. And we wonder why we find ourselves in the crossfire?
My political friends, in both the Sunni insurgency and among the Shia militias, have warmly received the promise of the positive signal inherent in President Obama’s enlightened approach to their Freedom Struggle. Informed by both, the Indonesian and Kenyan Liberation struggles, the President’s quest, not to reform a corrupt system, but to build anew, incidentally abroad as at home, is encouraging. The Peoples of the World are encouraged to find that the President does not consider an enlightened humanism to define American exceptionalism, but the world's destiny.
It is time to match the President’s rhetoric with goal-oriented action.
If the President truly considers “society” to be at the center of Governance, and not “government,” following in the tradition of Thomas Paine, then let us firmly put the “Rights of Man” on the front burner of a new American Foreign Policy. That presupposes a pro-democracy agenda, based on human rights and civil liberty, in advance of the normative, without regard for the expeditious. The message equally directed to Iran, PDRK and Sudan, as to PR China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt.
The President does hold within his grasp the possibility to win the “Wider War,” by transforming the Middle East and, in transforming the Middle East, by transforming the World, with the objective of forging an “Alliance of Democracies,” concomitant to which reform of the United Nations becomes feasible. That presupposes a re-alignment of America’s allies, friends and partners, a re-alignment predicated on a re-assessment of the U.S. national interest.
Key Point #3. The U.S. and Allied response to extremists is conceptually-flawed due to a lack of understanding of its actors, goals and modalities.
Extremists are outflanked at the far-end, not the near end, just as reconciliation comes at the far-end of conflagration, not the near end. As General Odierno impressed upon me on 18 January 2006: “From a United States perspective, it's about who threatens the United States. And so we have terrorists that are internal to the United States that are dealt with in certain ways, there are extremists that have an ideology that is a network that we're concerned about because of the long duration of that. And so we have to deal with these extremist networks both from a lethal and non-lethal way. I guess you have to get into the technical definitions between the two. The bottom line is who threatens the safety of our citizens in the United States and as well as our allies, and we will deal with it based on that.”
I am a firm believer in the Schwab Doctrine, which holds that contrary to “the foe,” who must be annihilated due to insurmountable hostilities, “the enemy” can be won over as an ally in advancing the tactical, while keeping the strategic in abeyance. As I stated on 29 November 2005: “Enlisting nationalist elements of the insurgency into the domestic political process seems like the best hope to improve Iraq's internal security situation and thence make possible the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" and -- the ultimate goal -- the restoration of full sovereignty. There are obvious preconditions for their inclusion in the process -- renunciation of terrorism, cessation of violence and the call for the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from Iraq, including non-Iraqi insurgents. The insurgents must be further engaged in a discussion of "legitimate" versus "illegitimate" use of violence as part of "national liberation" from what they perceive to be a foreign occupation.”
In aligning Jaish-al-Mehdi and the U.S. Army, I was guided by the Schwab Doctrine. However, contrary to the U.S. approach, to be taken with Taliban, I did not seek to co-opt moderate forces, but radical forces, nor did I endeavor to separate the rank and file from the leadership. From the beginning, I considered it a folly to make an effort to separate the Sadrist Movement from al-Sadr. I cautioned against it, and counter-acted any effort in that direction. Likewise, it is a folly to think that you will succeed in separating the Taliban from Mullah Omar.
At the same time, we must realize that there will be forces irreconcilable to reconciliation. The soft approach of counter-insurgency reaches its limits where it runs into the abyss of he, who wants to destroy you. Those forces must be vanquished. I prefer those elements not amenable to reconciliation to be taken out from within, rather than for me to do have to do so. Let us draw for those amenable to reconciliation clear cut rules of permissible behavior, which are pre-requisites for admission to the international community. This will require a serious dialogue between the civilizations, from which may result a separation between East and West. Personally, I find no fault in accepting that, in Iraq, Christians play a subordinated role to Muslims. On the understanding that our Muslim brothers and sisters fully appreciate that, in Europe, they play a subordinated role to us, Christians. Their religious symbols go up over the skyline of Berlin, the moment the cross is flown over Istanbul. On Islam, the West has permitted the East to subordinate the majority to the minority. It is time to reverse course. While not primal to the “Wider War,” there is a much denied religious component to the conflict.
Reciprocal arrangements based on understanding and conciliation must be the basis for an informed dialogue, rather than unilateral submission to minority rule. Both, the International Year of Reconciliation, 2009, and the International Year of Rapprochement between Civilizations, 2010, provide welcome venues. But, do let us strive for honesty in the dialogue and realize that we are confronting the outer limits of multi-culturalism. The Global Village may not be as harmonious/ deemed desirable as some may have wished for.
Furthermore, I disagree with the U.S. contention, as yet again pronounced by AMB Wood, that al-Qaeda is irredeemable. I have personally worked hard to drive a wedge between AQ/M and AQ/ Central on account of my firm position that those Iraqi nationals, members of AQ/M, too, will eventually have to be integrated into the political process. What else do you propose to do with them?
I have consistently argued with both Sheikh al-Sadr and the PM to engage AQ/M, with the objective of getting AQ/M to separate from AQ/C. To little avail, as my approach is, as yet, a no-go.
However, I do not believe that in Afghanistan you will get Taliban to move against AQ. What would make you think they would, given that on many doctrinal issues Taliban is even more orthodox than AQ and certainly, between the two, the caliber of leadership is the greater in AQ. And they’re all inter-related. They will continue to be guided by common interest in destabilizing Pakistan. Any effort in Afghanistan, which addresses Taliban, but does not address AQ, is doomed to failure! Clearly, bin-Laden and Dr. Zawahiri will remain personas non-grata, awaiting Camry. But, a modus of infiltration must be found to co-opt the younger AQ leadership. Do you, honestly, believe in an all-out U.S. battlefield victory over AQ? I do not.
When co-opting “the enemy,” keeping the strategic in abeyance, while furthering advance of the tactical, we must remain mindful that, eventually, the strategic must be addressed. The strategic answer to the Iraq Question, for example, remains elusive and that concerns me, greatly, as the denouement of U.S. active engagement in Iraq comes underway. In advance of the tactical in 2007, the U.S. has made too many promises on the strategic, which are not being kept. Those IOUs will come due.
Key Point #9. In the current climate, domestic and international, the U.S. and Allied Powers fail to deflect the threat perception emanating from the specter of a “GREATER WAR.” A war, which involves the Big Powers. While not yet blowing, the Winds of War are gathering beyond the graying horizon. Let us not, in years to come, have to answer, “Why America Slept.”
The failure of the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve military and political objectives is disquieting. How do your adversaries view the lack of success: Russia and PR China?
Russia and PR China are challenging the United States on both political and military fronts. The U.S. does not have the financial means to redress the Russian and Chinese military build-up. Only time will tell, if a weakened U.S. will be able to muster the political will to counter Russia and China.
Post Cold-War confrontation, from the Balkans onward, have seen First World forces pitted against Third World forces. And where, one should ask, is the contest? What could at best be described as post-Colonial police action is taking the Armed Forces of the United States to the brink of collapse. While battlefield success remains elusive. Following a ten-year NATO engagement in Kosovo, the Kosovo Question remains unresolved. And NATO plans to resole the Afghanistan Question in how many years? It should be understood that it will take upward of a decade to bring Afghan military and security forces up to levels now under consideration by the Administration. Will you have the political, economic and military staying power for the long haul?
The United States Army, which was supposed to stop the Russians at the Fulda Gap, is unable to win against what to some degree are juvenile delinquents on the streets of Third World cities. Already, the two-war doctrine is under review. And you do expect to meet the growing Russian and Chinese challenge how? And I won’t even mention PDRK.
The United States lacks capacity to confront an assertive PR China and a resurgent Russia. Depleted public coffers will severely restrict big-ticket military procurement for years to come. As a result, the United States lacks capacity and intent to stay engaged, globally, to the extent to which an over-ambitious global agenda finds you engaged. Failing on the field of battle, weakened in the corridors of diplomacy, the economy collapsed. I do not dare draw historic comparisons.
The Administration is in the process of affecting a major strategic adjustment in the “Larger War,” moving the front from Iraq to Afghanistan. I am not a proponent of this move. The national U.S. interest is at stake in Iraq, because of continued U.S. reliance on affordable oil, Iraq’s potential juxtaposition in the ME and potential positioning contra Iran. Combining Saudi oil and Egypt’s level of sophistication, as I impress upon my Iraqi friends, Iraq could be the ME powerhouse.
Vital U.S. national interests are not at stake in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a failed State and, like many States around the world, will remain a failed State for years to come. Please note, nearly all Muslim republics of the former USSR have now turned authoritarian, with President Aliyev having pushed through a flawed referendum on 18 March 2009, declaring himself President for Life. Failure in Afghanistan will not adversely impact the United States. Just as loosing Afghanistan to the Soviets for a decade, nor loosing Afghanistan to the Taliban for a decade, did not adversely impact the United States.
And yet, shortly, the public affairs machinery will endeavor to convince the American people that holding this town or that mountain will be essential to the U.S., just as they were made to believe that Danang was essential. Danang was lost, costing around 3,000 lives, the whole of Vietnam was lost, costing 58,000 lives, did it adversely impact the United States.
It is regrettable that on war, rhetoric too often comes at the expense of fact. In times of war, the most insignificant of factors may assume great import. But only as a result of the fallacy of false prophecy, against which prudent counsel must caution. To paraphrase Sun, Wing may be essential to the taking of Wang, which may be essential to the taking of Wong. But, have we really determined that the taking of Wong is essential?
Afghanistan is important, because we will not want to permit her, yet again, to provide safe heaven to AQ. But, if not welcome in Afghanistan, AQ will move to Sudan, Somalia, or a host of other countries. Therefore, if we do believe AQ to remain a direct threat to the U.S., let us make Afghanistan the decisive battleground, with the objective of AQ’s outright annihilation. That raises, again, the issue of capacity and intent. It also raises serious questions about strategy.
Moreover, as I am given to understand, at this point, U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is not based on Afghanistan qua se, but with the objective of deflecting from the potential threat perception of Pakistan’s collapse and potential Indo-Pak confrontation. Within this context, the stationing of a deterrent force/ rapid deployment force is sensible.
I feel compelled to caution against continued efforts to particularize President Karzai, to the extent of wanting to isolate him. He will retain the reigns of power, through summer. That, if he so chooses, will enable him to counter any NATO decision to augment Allied troop levels, to be taken at the Strassburg-Kehl summit in April, which leaves the Administration’s Afghanistan plan vulnerable. Off course both, lacking support for Member States of NATO to share the burden of troop augmentation and a possible disavowal of troop augmentation by President Karzai, could give the Administration a way out, if such a fallback option were deemed desirable. Certainly it would help pave the way for the smaller footprint, which is in the works, with an eye on Pakistan.
Furthermore, President Karzai’s own efforts to reach out to the Taliban could yield a grand bargain: a National Reconciliation Government, with Taliban participation, which calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan. That would spell the end to any Western stabilization effort in South Asia.
I have previously expanded on AQ’s covert action in Kashmir. This activity should be seen integral to the “Larger War,” which to widen into a “Greater War,” plays to the advantage of AQ and the Taliban.
The United States is over-extended, militarily and politically. Not having succeeded in Iraq, you’re about to apply the lessons in Afghanistan, which did not work in Iraq. And in Iraq, you’re just confronting incompetence. In Afghanistan, you’re confronting corruption and criminality on top of incompetence. And an enemy even more cunning, if not outright treacherous, than the Sunni insurgent or Shia militia in Iraq.
Meanwhile, U.S. commitments are being widened: among other, to DARFUR. Sure, we all know what’s going on there. And we rightly would want to stop it. But, are we clear in our minds that Darfur will result in a surrogate showdown with PR China and will you have the fortitude to see it through, given potential political, economic and military costs?
With the ICC indictment of GEN Bashir a line has now been drawn. In my view, Sudan, more than Afghanistan, will test the mettle of the Obama Administration, both the normative commitment of its foreign policy and its crisp execution. The U.S.-Soviet showdown in Lebanon in 1982 would seem to come to mind. Will you permit the impression to grow among your African friends that you uphold international law, when it comes to Saddam, but not when it comes to Bashir? On the other hand, the AU and Arab League position on executing the indictment is at best tentative. At the same time, the Sudan Question extends well beyond General Bashir.
Will you have the nerve to stand up to PR China, just as you need them to finance your economic recovery?
Too distracted are you by counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism to keep an eye on Russia and PR China. You can keep quiet about it, but the U.S. Navy engagement with the Chinese in the South China Sea was not confidence-inspiring. Just, as I find the lack of a response to the Russian military build-up not confidence-inspiring. Here you accede to Russian demands on the missile shield, all but conceding the extension of the near-near abroad to include the near abroad, widening the Russian security perimeter, or however you want to call it, while ostensibly forcing the Eastern Europeans to keep quiet about the sell-out, and how do the Russians thank you? Resetting the button must have a different meaning to them.
I am not for a minute advocating for the United States to disengage. That would be a disaster. But, re-evaluate your priorities on the basis of (vital) national interest, upon which is dependent clear definitions of objectives over goals and fit your modalities to match your objectives, while building up your capacity. Not every crisis calls for U.S. action. That presupposes clarity of purpose, on the basis of which you must allocate the resources necessary to effect a major U.S. military expansion. Or, when that war standard has been hoisted, you will find yourself coming out short. Following 9/11, President Bush led you into battle on the cheap. Time is approaching for President Obama to mobilize the American people to the “Greater War” looming.
PART THREE: War Progress Report (Iraq)
“The American war effort, if not yet collapsing, can no longer be won. The United States, on its own, is in no position to achieve the stated war objectives!… One would hope that the Americans will realize that the surge is failing to meet its stated military and political objectives and realize why it is failing. Further, one would hope for them to realize that these shortcomings both, military and political, cannot, in the near-term, be redressed to change the situation, strategically. That in order to avoid outright defeat the strategy must be adjusted to reflect the emerging military and political realities confronting the U.S. war effort, in theatre and at home.”
So my statement on 19 July 2007.
In my recommendations to Sheikh al-Sadr, all approved, but for my proposition to reach out to AQ/M, I go on to state: “We should further make it clear that we fully support the calls for an end to sectarian killings, the disarmament of militias and an equitable distribution of oil-revenue. Towards that end, our recommendations to adjust the strategy should be:
I. Demilitarize the strategy, adjusted: even though reconciliation comes at the far end of conflagration and the argument can be made that, perhaps, violence has, not yet, been at the level necessary to get people to their senses, lack of capacity and intent will make a sustainable military effort, aimed at helping facilitate a political solution, unrealistic.
II. Reverse surge. Set deadlines for immediate re-deployment (within 180 days, i.e. spring 2008) and near-term withdrawal. (within 540 days, i.e. 9 April 2009) Replace departing troops with militias and insurgents, amenable to political compromise and re-configuration under government control either, at the level of the central government or the provincial level. Encourage recall of eligible soldiers of the Iraqi Army, in particular Specialized Republican Guard.”
On the eve of Iraq Liberation Day 2009, I am pleased to find the United States and the Sadrist Movement on the same page, in advance of earliest possible restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance. As I stated on 1 February 2007: “The Battle for Baghdad (is underway). … public order (is being restored,) even imposed, as called for by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The vicious cycle of increasing street violence eroding public confidence in the young democratic system (is being) broken. However, differences of opinion persist as to how to (continue to) wage the battle and how to determine success, both in military and political terms. Who will make the call, when and based on what? And how to position the Battle for Baghdad within the larger denouement of the Iraq question?
Although of import to winning the war in Iraq, success or failure in the Battle for Baghdad will not, on its own prove decisive in changing the winds of war. Yet, again, as they have done throughout, America’s fighting sons and daughters may achieve a tactical objective, i.e. to secure the capital, while failing to achieve the larger strategic objective, i.e. to secure the country. Moreover, the battle’s significance to the war on terror(ism) is overdrawn, just as is inflated the threat perception emanating from failure. Even at this stage of the war its link to terror(ism) is, at best, tenuous.”
I shall leave it to your considered judgment to match my statement against the current situation on the ground. Need I say more?
In my statement of 1 February 2007, I go on to state: “In advancing a new trinity of “clear, hold, rebuild,” General Petraeus has taken heed of historic lessons learned in the Philippines, Yemen and Malaya. Without a political framework, however, being advanced parallel to the military cause of action now embarked upon, the Iraq question stands the risk of becoming ever more militarized. Although national reconciliation comes at the far-end of conflagration, making the parties to the conflict amenable to a negotiated settlement based on compromise, we are all agreed that there is no military solution.
The battle royal to come may well be a case study for Clausewitz’s call for head-on confrontation versus Sun Tzu’s admonition to exercise restraint. Where General Petraeus is manifestly guided by an astute understanding of Clausewitz, especially his experiences during the Napoleonic wars, calling for highly mobile forces in hot posse pursuit of the enemy, Sunni insurgents and Shia militia, as already in evidence in al-Sadr’s orders to the Mehdi Army to stand down, should be expected to follow Sun Tzu who, on the basis of his experience during the “Warring States” period, (453-221 B.C.) and in anti-thesis to Clausewitz, calls for victory without battle. Bearing in mind that a protracted war, marked by stalemate on the battlefield, one, which in the words of CJCS is defined as “not being won, not being lost,” plays against the regular force, not the irregular one. Time favors the defender under ground, not the attacker above ground. The United States must win, the enemy just not loose.”
Times has run out on the United States Army in Iraq. Or, is there anyone in this room who truly believes you have won?
As I go on to state: “General Petraeus may have set himself up for defeat, given, inter alia, the manifest shortcomings in manpower, political will and time to see the plan through. The soldier/ per capita ratio is off, deployment falls short of what he called for, the window of opportunity is narrow. As a battle plan rarely survives first contact with the enemy, these constraints limit General Petraeus’s room for maneuver, adjustment. To work, all elements of the plan would have to come together, flawlessly, which presupposes a level of coordination/ cooperation with the Iraqis which, to date, has been found wanting. Moreover, the military outflanks the political, running the risk of proceeding independent thereof. Although, from a macro-theoretical perspective the Army’s new counter-insurgency manual, which the General helped write, is sound and will stand the test of history, in translating it into the war plan for the Battle for Baghdad, he may have failed to dissociate politics from strategy. Important the more, as counter-insurgency, house-to-house close-range big city combat, is not traditionally purview of the U.S. Army. Therefore, the Battle for Baghdad must be seen as a tactical gambit to regain the strategic initiative, a worthwhile albeit feasible gambit. But, a gambit. It must be appreciated as such.”
The gambit has not paid off. Americans and Iraqis are beginning to re-assess the cost-benefit of the surge, and the war at-large. A parting of the ways is underway. As I stated at the time: “While not yet a “political war,” the political and military components of the war effort run the risk of ending up on parallel tracks. It remains to be seen for how long, beyond the plan’s initial success, the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders remain insulated from public criticism.
One of the main weaknesses in General Petraeus’ approach may lie in his dialectical method of presentation. Believing the political in follow-on to the military to form the basis on which to separate the populus from the insurgents, he seems to view war as neither “nothing but” a show of force nor “merely” a rational act of politics or policy. Given that in Iraq, however, the one tends to be a function of the other, could provide a conceptual flaw to be exploited by the other side.
What outcome, then, do we envision for the Battle for Baghdad? Banal, as it may sound, there are only two: victory or defeat. Success or failure. Success defined as establishing a security environment somewhere similar to that of Israel. Failure defined as anything but conclusive/ decisive, which either decimates/ eliminates the enemy, or makes him amenable to political compromise. To paraphrase General MacArthur, Given that the Battle for Baghdad, the war in Iraq, is a confrontation between regular versus irregular forces (developed vs. developing world) victory must be swift and sustainable to be decisive, with the objective of breaking enemy moral.”
I shall leave it to your considered judgment to determine whether that has happened. And yet, contrary to financial markets, in diplomatic life the perception is as often as important as the reality. And the general perception is one of tactical success in Iraq. One would hope for disengagement prior to tactical success being turned into open strategic defeat.
I am truly pleased to have lent a helping hand to the U.S. Army in aligning Jaish-al-Mehdi with U.S. interests on the basis of tactical synergies, while keeping the strategic in abeyance. But, not unlike a long-term debt, the strategic is coming due and that is, where the United States and Iraq will part ways.
As I state on 5 December 2007: “The progress being made by United States Armed Forces in the Battle for Baghdad, and beyond, upon which greatly depends progress in the larger War, is well known and may, I hope, be deemed satisfactory and encouraging to those who remain committed to a timely United States victory. It needs no further elucidation on this occasion, beyond GEN Odierno’s encouraging report.
JAM is an integral part of the U.S. Army’s success in Baghdad and now, beyond. I continue to maintain that somewhere between advance of “redeployment without replacement” and “non-interference by outside powers” creative diplomacy will find a compromise resolution to the Iraq Question, in advance of restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance. … I like to believe that, as I promised in January, we have given the U.S. Army grounds, on which to declare the troop surge “a success.” Yet, I must caution and remind everyone that JAM is going along with this ambitious take on Iraq’s political versus security situation, in order to facilitate the “redeployment without replacement,” not for the U.S.A. to dig in, further. JAM does not seek an immediate, nor uncoordinated withdrawal of U.S. forces, nor do we consider such a move in the best interest of Iraq, presupposing that they will be withdrawn, eventually. … At the same time, depth and duration of the “smashing success” will depend on the al-Maliki Government’s ability to align the political track with the military track. I do not see that happening. And agree, with LGEN Odierno, that by summer (2008) we will have to adjust the strategy. And that adjustment will have to be based on a further demilitarization. What we are witnessing is the surge’s initial success, which, unless Shia militias and Sunni insurgents are engaged, politically, integral to national reconciliation in advance of national accord, will prove fleeting. Sustainability will depend on JAM’s continued cooperation and the next steps of both, the U.S. and Iraqi Governments.”
That’s what I said, then. And, that’s what I say now. And I conclude with my assessment of Iraqi military and security forces. As I sate on 29 November 2005: “By all assessments, the U.S. administration's estimate of 18-24 months to build up Iraqi security forces, especially the police, to necessary levels of numbers and competency is unrealistic. Against that background enlisting nationalist elements of the insurgency into the domestic political process seems like the best hope to improve Iraq's internal security situation and thence make possible the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" and -- the ultimate goal -- the restoration of full sovereignty.”
My assessment was as valid in 2005. As it was in 2007. As it is, today, in 2009. At the earliest, Iraq will be able to stand on her own feet: in 2018!
PART FOUR: The Iraq Question
The Iraq Question is best defined by the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq. National accord remains elusive on both fronts.
What will be Iraq’s future between the secular and the religious? The answer to the one will provide guide and counsel to the other. With Iraq’s secular leadership ineffective, remaining quagmired in the nitty-gritty of superficial daily contentiousness, time has come for Iraq’s religious leadership to assert its legitimate role within the Iraqi body politic.
The question is not whether the Religious will assert itself over the political, but when, under what circumstances and to what avail. Whether, or not, in so doing the Iraqi religious leadership will operate independent of Iran, or in collaboration with Iran, shall depend on the role the United States will now play in the denouement of the War, through 31 December 2011. Will the U.S. effort be viewed as inimical to Shia interests, or in advance of Shia interests? The promise dimming with every move by the United States, perceived as limiting the role of the Religious in the post-Liberation political order of Iraq.
As yet, I contend, an enlightened Iraqi Shia leadership may assert the Religious in advance of the Democratic. There also remains the fleeting promise of a post-Liberation Iraq asserting herself over Iran. Bilateral relations will continue to deteriorate both, on account of Iran’s continued meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs, as well as on account of Iran ever more strongly asserting sovereignty over three key oil facilities in the Shatt-al-Arab. These two acts on the part of Iran alone should help position Iraq against Iran in any future showdown, even where from the Western perspective Iran‘s nuclear aspirations may be the more important casus belli. It being my contention that if Iran is to be confronted, then let this confrontation come sooner, rather than later. The Iraqi leadership will have to look to both, her Northern front, and her Western front. While a coming together of Iranians and Kurds is difficult for some to fathom, strategic planning must redress the threat perception of the one over the other.
To avert an Islamic revolution a la Iranian mode presupposes a willingness to embrace the radical, with the objective of deflecting the extremist. While Sharia law will be the law of the land, it may be permitted to exist in unison with the Constitution, as is.
The good news is that, prima face, the controversies confronting Iraq are more political and secular than religious. That means they are susceptible to a negotiated political settlement. The religious being introduced to rally support, stiffen the resistance and to provide an elevated platform for resistance and a jihadi framework for the pursuit of the political. Common cause and an alliance among the religious leaders across the East-West, Islamic-Christian, divide will further help move those political pieces of the insurgency/ militia closer to a resolution. Within this context, we should avail ourselves of the venues provided by the International Year of Reconciliation in 2009 and the International Year of Rapprochement between Civilizations in 2010.
This will take a coordinated effort, but must be done. Without this kind of political movement, to reach out beyond the great West-East divide, we will continue to fail in the “Larger War,” or in other words, while a necessary part of the equation, the military is not sufficient without the political agreement to see the process through to a conclusion.
The bad news is that the approach taken to date continues to fail to appreciate the actors, their objectives, goals and modalities. To date, we have not grasped an Iraqi National Awakening. We continue to call for Iraqi reconciliation, failing to realize that Iraqis do not lack reconciliation, they lack conciliation as, following Colonial rule, the tribes, which make up Iraq, have never been granted the free-will exercise to determine their national destiny.
Iraqis must be permitted to determine for themselves the formation of the post-Liberation nation-State. If a possible plebiscite leads to partition, then so be it. Neither Sheikh al-Sadr, nor the PM, share my position on a plebiscite.
Further, we fail to appreciate that the Iraq Question is driven by the quest of the disenfranchised for power, a quest which, as yet, could enable an enlightened leadership to unite Shia, Sunni, Kurd and Christian in an “Alliance of Reason,” with the religious a means to advance the political. A revolution, turned inward, as opposed to outward. That is why I continue to argue in favor of cross-sectarian talks with the leadership of the insurgency and the militia on a political platform to be advanced integral to the Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation. These talks must include all of Iraq’s religious and ethnic minorities.
Yet, while the liberation struggle is political and about power, one must not fail to appreciate that the ultima ratio is religious in nature, i. e. to push the religious into the public sphere. As Iraq’s religious leadership is looking for an increased role for the religious in the public life of Iraq, there is a strong basis for common ground with religious fundamentalists the world over, all yearning to come out of under the yoke of an ill-guided secularism, which is destroying Christian faith-based societies, as much as it is destroying Islamic faith-based societies by advancing atheism and materialism at the expense of the divine.
I support Pope Benedict’s call for an “increased Christian role in the affairs of Europe” and, in so doing, Islamists should feel encouraged to stake out a claim for an increased Islamic role in the affairs of the Levant. Formal approach should be made to the Holy See. We should entertain a leading role for the Holy See in East-West Inter-Religious Dialogue.
As we prepare to lay the groundwork for a post-Liberation political agenda to redress the Iraq Question, I would like to reference past efforts of former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Programmatically, we should support a “New Contract for All Iraqis:” to be based on Hope, Tolerance, Nonviolence, Conciliation and Unity. The contract must acknowledge the operant dynamic/ linkage between improved security, withdrawal of foreign forces, regular and irregular, non-interference by outside powers, restoration of sovereignty and self-governance. Non-interference by outside powers, linked to the withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, may prove the most realistic political objective the U.S. can now achieve.
Operationally, we should advance two processes: 1.) Internal to Iraq: we should jumpstart the National Reconciliation Process: A National Reconciliation (All Party) Conference, to which all stakeholders in the Iraqi body politic are to be invited both, non-governmental and governmental, should be called for. To be preceded by the long overdue Summit of Militia and Insurgency Leaders. It is in fusing the two, where long-term, I hold out hope for stabilizing Iraq’s security situation, post-liberation.
An Eminent Persons Group, under the patronage of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, with its members drawn from the political and religious leadership of all constituent groups of the Iraqi body politic, subscribing to national accord, including Christians, could help steer post-Conference follow-up and follow-on.
Regrettably, the al-Maliki government’s approach to national reconciliation is wrong both, in conceptual and procedural terms. Within this context, I would, again, like to set forth three principles: 1.) Reconciliation takes place external to government, at the nexus of the non-governmental and governmental levels of action. The approach taken, whereby one thinks that some meaningless piece of legislation, even where it to be passed by Parliament, the Oil Law and the Kirkuk referendum come to mind, will help realign extremists is erroneous. What is needed is a process, external to government, in which extremists get to advance their political objectives, upon renunciation of violence, with the objective of their integration into the body politic. That is, certainly, the lesson of the African experience.
2.) I have previously stated that extremists are outflanked on the far-end, not the near-end and 3.) that reconciliation comes at the far end of conflagration. At the point, when the parties to the conflict are either dead, or realize the futility of armed struggle in advance of political objectives. This, however, comes only at the far-end of exhaustion, or utter brutality. Or, granted, when the civilian population is turned. Neither of which is the case in Iraq.
To date, militias and insurgents are being talked about, rather than talked to. That must change. A Summit of Militia Leaders should be convened as a necessary antecedent to the national reconciliation conference. In particular, the summit should consider (1.) a permanent cessation of the armed struggle; (2.) permanent integration of eligible elements of the insurgency and the militia into Iraqi military and security forces, with possible placement at the regional level. The American National Guard experience would seem to lend guide and counsel. Promises made to insurgents and militias on this count are being broken; (3.) a robust DD&R programme, including a weapons-collection/ buy-back programme and (public works) jobs program. Too many of the men I served with are idling and idleness breeds mischievousness.; (4.) national accord on “the vision for the New Iraq,” i.e. the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq, including and in particular, the role of the religious in Iraq’s public sphere; (5.) restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance, integral to the Movement for the National Liberation of Iraq from Foreign Occupation, in advance of the early withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraqi territory, regular and irregular; (6.) Shia EMPOWERMENT on the basis of majority rule, with safeguards for minority rights; (7.) a general and blanket amnesty, available to ALL Iraqi nationals, willing to lay down their arms and to join the political process.
I realize that tentative progress is being made in some of these areas, what remains lacking is the overall chapeau. That’s where the national reconciliation process is paramount. I further realize that some of the proposed agenda items may prove difficult for you to fathom. But, the agenda must be all-inclusive and non-discriminatory.
The summit must be seen integral to the political track, in advance of the process for national reconciliation. In that, it builds on the variable operant dynamics at play between restoration of public order, self-governance, Iraqi sovereignty and national accord on the New and Democratic Iraq. In advance of national accord, which is envisioned to emanate at the far-end of the national reconciliation process, the national reconciliation conference must advance agreement on the principles, political and religious, which are to govern the New Iraq. All Iraqi citizens, willing to sign onto the national accord and to lay down their arms, shall be eligible for a general and blanket amnesty. Economic incentives, including pensions, integral to a multi-faceted Demobilization, Decommissioning and Rehabilitation of militia and insurgent fighters will have to be made available.
2.) External to Iraq, we should look to convening an international conference in support of Iraq’s internal efforts, (!) and for said purpose alone, could be envisioned to address Iraq's juxtaposition within the Middle East, security assurances and economic development. The Compact, adjusted accordingly, may prove a viable venue. The sole purpose of the conference to augment the process, internal to Iraq. And yet, legitimate concerns of Iraq's neighbors could be addressed, perhaps better within the larger international framework, rather than merely within the regional. The Iraq Question must not be internationalized, but internalized. Iraq for the Iraqis.
The conference would advance the operant dynamic/ linkage between withdrawal of all foreign forces, regular and irregular, and non-interference by outside powers, into which U.S. redeployment/ withdrawal can be absorbed. Getting Iran/ Syria to commit not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq may be among the few long-term objectives, U.S. diplomacy can achieve, short-term. Within this context, the potential role of UN peacekeeping, post 31 December 2011, an International Stabilization Force, should be looked at.
I would like to affirm: Iraq’s military and security forces shall not be ready, on 1 January 2012, to assume sole responsibility for Iraq’s security. As we all know, it is unrealistic to assume that all U.S. forces shall be withdrawn on hat date. I cannot sufficiently stress the need for an interim-International Force, under U.N/ Arab League auspices.
I would also, at this time, like to draw your attention to an anti-U.S.-backlash. You do not want to find yourself unprepared. There should be no question about the jubilation of the masses, in January 2012, as they file into Camp Victory. You do not, then, want them to turn on the U.S. Embassy compound.
A Contact Group, to be comprised of the UN, EU, OIC, Arab League, the P-5, relevant and interested powers, could be envisioned to help steer conference follow-up and follow-on. Post-Liberation, only a small fingerprint will make continued outside involvement palatable. And yet, as Iraq will remain unable to govern self, through the decade to come, this small fingerprint is essential to avoid outright collapse under variable internal political and economic strains.
An Eminent Persons Group internal to Iraq and a Contact Group external to Iraq could provide a chapeau for the dual-track framework, with the objective of helping advance maximum coordination and harmonization of security in all its aspects. If successful, the operant dynamic, inherent in the dual-track framework, could be considered for the convening of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) to explore vistas, venues and modalities to address and redress the gamut of political-military, economic and social issues, confronting the ME. Such a bold initiative, however, would require willingness to proceed on Palestinian Statehood. I see great potential for post-Liberation Iraqi diplomacy on this one. There is, in advance of Iraq’s leading ME role, benefit to be derived from linking Iraq’s liberation struggle to the quest for Palestinian statehood. We should position Shia Iraq in the forefront of an awakening pan-Arab nationalism. We should support the effort and aim to link it up to a larger ME Conference a la CSCME.
